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Abstract The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of real-
ity by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence 
which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of exist-
ence which are used in metaphysical theories of time (in presentism and eternalism) 
have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless 
for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with 
our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical 
and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of 
this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver 
allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that 
time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, 
homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also per-
mits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for 
example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. 
Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphys-
ical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and 
the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and 
persistence through time by endurance.
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1 Introduction
We know—or seem to know—that the present is continuously changing from eve-
ryday experience; that instantaneous events which come into being have to cease to 
be because the past no longer exists.1 In a reverse way, future events—as we imagine 
them although they do not exist—come into existence for a moment to cease to be. 
These facts are taken at face value by presentism, that is the view usually formulated 
as the view saying that only the present things exist, or that only the present things 
are real; and denied by eternalism, the view saying that the past, present, and future 
things exist in the same way (or are ontologically on a par, or are equally real).2 But 
then—taking for granted that daily experience does not deceive us—some funda-
mental questions arise of where are past things, that is objects like Socrates, which 
existed in the past but no longer exist? What is their ontological status and what is 
the difference between them and fictitious objects, like, for example, Zeus and Dio-
nysius? In a similar way, we can ask where are the future things and events which 
are to become present? Are they waiting somewhere for the right moment to come 
into existence or, maybe, moving from the future to the present and then into the 
past? Is the flow of time responsible for these phenomena? But if it is, what does 
the flow of time consist in, and can it avoid serious difficulties connected with the 
questions: How fast does time flow?; Why does the future seem to be open while the 
past is fixed? Why is the causation we observe in the world always future directed, 
that is, why do causes precede effects, in spite of the fact that the physical interac-
tions (with the exception of weak interactions) are time reversal invariant? Why do 
we have traces of the past and no traces of the future? And, finally, why do at least 
some objects, for example, the author of this paper and their readers, persist through 
time—as our experience seems to indicate—retaining our strict (or literal, or numer-
ical) identity, that is, why do we endure and not have temporal parts?3
These are fundamental metaphysical questions and this paper will try to answer 
some of them by analyzing the problems in two ways: from an empirical point of 
view and the metatheoretical point of view4 or—in other words— by tracing an 
1 The paper develops ideas from Gołosz (2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017c).
2 Because I am looking for a proper formulation of presentism, I will concentrate on the two main com-
peting views of presentism and eternalism and will not consider the Growing Block Universe Theory, 
according to which the past and the present (but not the future) exist or are equally real (see e.g. Broad 
1923; Tooley 1997).
3 There are two opposite views on persistence: endurantism and perdurantism. According to the lat-
ter, things perdure, meaning persistence through time by having temporal parts, persisting things are 
here treated as mereological aggregates of temporal parts, none of which are strictly identical with one 
another. Usually, the enduring of things generally assumed by presentists is defined as a persistence over 
time by being wholly present at each time but, as it was noticed by Merricks (1994: 182), “(…) the heart 
of the endurantist’s ontology is expressed by claims like ‘[object] O at t is identical with [object] O at 
t*’.” For the author of this paper, this second condition alone suffices for the definition of endurantism 
and is a better criterion of endurance so it will be used in what follows.
4 Taking into account the theory-laden nature of observation, it is not so easy to differentiate between 
the empirical and theoretical (or metatheoretical) approach to problems; I assume (crudely) the empirical 
approach to be the one which is interested in our world while the theoretical (or metatheoretical) consists 
in the analysis of our theoretical knowledge.
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upward and downward path to the problems. This first means a requirement to look 
for a solution which remains in agreement with our everyday experience, while the 
second point of view means that the solution should provide us with satisfactory—
or at least promising—answers to the questions raised above and that this solution 
should remain in agreement with empirical sciences.
The second section of the paper will try to show that our daily experience seems 
to force us to assume the existence of the flow of time; the third will try to prove that 
the properly understood passage of time compels us to reconceptualize presentism, 
and that to this end we should swap the common notion of existence, which has a 
static character, for a new one—dynamic. This third section and the next one will 
also attempt to demonstrate that the proposed formulation of the ontological thesis 
of presentism will turn out to be equivalent to a thesis expressing the existence of 
the flow of time and as such it can provide us with satisfactory, or at least promising 
answers for the above mentioned difficult questions. The fifth section examines the 
problem of the agreement of the proposed version of presentism with the empirical 
sciences. The paper ends with some conclusions.
2  St. Augustine’s Challenge
As that clear-sighted observer of reality—especially concerning time—St. Augus-
tine noted in the famous 11th book of the Confessions:
Boldly for all this dare I affirm myself to know thus much; that if nothing were 
passing, there would be no past time: and if nothing were coming, there should 
be no time to come: and if nothing were, there should now be no present time. 
Those two times therefore, past and to come, in what sort are they, seeing the 
past is now no longer, and that to come is not yet ? As for the present, should 
it always be present and never pass into times past, verily it should not be time 
but eternity. If then time present, to be time, only comes into existence because 
it passeth into time past; how can we say that also to be, whose cause of being 
is, that it shall not be: that we cannot, forsooth, affirm that time is, but only 
because it is tending not to be? (St. Augustine 1912: 239)
There are controversies about St. Augustine’s approach to time, largely centered 
around whether it is subjective or objective. Although I am a supporter of the lat-
ter, I will not assume this stance in this paper but rather what I claim is that every 
supporter of presentism should treat the phenomena described by the author of the 
Confessions as objective and that s/he should explain the issues raised by him.
What are the issues raised by St. Augustine? There is one condition and two 
important questions. Beginning with the first, he wrote that if nothing passed away, 
the time called the past was not; and if nothing were coming, the time to come was 
not either; and if nothing were, then the time called the present could not be either. 
This means exactly that if the flow of time did not exist, the present would not exist 
either, and in such a case we could not claim that the past was and the future will be. 
And because the presentists maintain that the past was, that the future will be, the 
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present exists, and that there was a time when our present events were the future, 
they must admit the existence of the flow of time. What is also important here is 
that presentists cannot trade the monadic property of “being past”, for the B-rela-
tion “earlier than”, the monadic property of “being future” for the B-relation “later 
than”, and the monadic property of “being present” for the B-relation “simultaneous 
with” because these relations—as was noticed by McTaggart (1908)—are fixed and 
do not change in time so in such a case there would be no coming into existence and 
no passing away and the condition posited by St. Augustine would be not satisfied. 
So, because the adherents of presentism claim that the present exists but must pass 
away, that the past existed and the future will exist, they must accept the following 
condition, which deserves to be called St. Augustine’s Condition (AC)5:
AC  Presentism has to admit the existence of the flow of time
St. Augustine also asks in the further part of the citation:
Q1  Those two times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is 
not, and that to come is not yet?
And the second question in the remaining fragment of the quotation, which can 
be briefly formulated as:
Q2  How can we say that the present is, if it only comes into existence for a 
moment and passes into time past, that is, if it is tending not to be?
Now, I would like to discuss the second problem, which has the form of the 
question Q1. This question is fundamental and not so easy to answer. We know, of 
course, that the future and the past do not exist (although they did exist or will exist, 
respectively) when we take this word in the tensed meaning, the problem is, how-
ever, that this does not exhaust all aspects of the subject. For, when we analyze the 
ontology of presentism in its standard version, we can say only about objects that do 
exist and that nothing more exist: the ordinary meaning of the word exist, as we use 
it in ontology and which I will later call static because it has a static character, only 
allows one to say that something does exist, or does not exist. Nonetheless, although 
Socrates and Dionysius do not exist (in the tensed meaning of this word), there is 
a fundamental difference between them: the first did exist and the second did not. 
So, how to express the ontological difference between them if both do not exist (in 
the tensed meaning of this word), or—saying this in a simpler way—where are past 
things, what kind of ontological domain do they form, “how are they”? The eternal-
ist can simply say that Socrates does exist (in the tenseless meaning of this word),6 
6 After Quine (1960: 170), we can introduce tenseless verbs in the following way: “We can conveniently 
hold to the grammatical present as a form but treat it as temporally neutral.” I am not interested in this 
paper in the question of the existence of abstract objects and consequently I will ignore this issue.
5 See Gołosz (2017c: 288).
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and Dionysius does not, the presentist, however, should not use tenseless language, 
at least s/he must not use it as his main philosophical language. So, how should the 
presentist explain the difference between Socrates and Dionysius, that is, what is the 
ontological status of the past and what is the difference between the past and fic-
tion? And a similar problem arises for the future: what is its ontological status? It is 
obvious that there must be some difference between what will happen (for example, 
in London tomorrow) and what will not (for example, paradise on Earth), although 
both do not exist.
The answer to this question can be sought by invoking the condition AC: the 
difference between Socrates and Dionysius is that there was a time when the first 
existed and there was no time in which the second did, and that it is the flow of time 
which is responsible for the fact that Socrates ceased to be, and for the ontologi-
cal difference between him and Dionysius, who has never existed. This entails once 
again that the presentist should accept the flow of time as an essential part of his 
ontological position. Temporarily setting aside the problematic question of what the 
flow of time consists in, the rub lies in the fact, that the simple acceptance of the 
flow of time in a form of moving now still does not explain all aspects of the second 
issue; we still do not know what it means that some objects like Socrates did exist 
although they do not exist (in the tensed meaning of this word) and where are they, 
that is, what is the ontological status of the past. The point is that in the domain of 
our ontology we only include objects which exist, where the word “exist” is under-
stood in the tensed meaning by the presentist, and tenseless by the eternalist. There 
is no place for objects which existed or will exist.
St. Augustine’s condition also sheds some light on the second of St. Augustine’s 
questions Q2; this is the flow of time which is responsible for the transient character 
of the present, that events that exist have to cease to be. But this third problem of St. 
Augustine shows us something more as well; if the present is continuously passing, 
we cannot simply say that the present things statically exist at some fixed moment 
of time. But that means that the usual notion of a fixed existence at a moment of 
time is not appropriate for expressing the transitory character of the present, and that 
it should be changed in such a way as to make it dynamic if we want to remain in 
agreement with our experience.
3  Presentism, Flow of Time, and Dynamic Existence
St. Augustine’s observations (realistically interpreted) show us, as the above analysis 
tried to demonstrate, that the presentist should introduce the thesis about the exist-
ence of the flow of time into his ontological view and that s/he should formulate his/
her position in a dynamic way. Many presentists are often unaware of this problem7 
and they usually formulate their position with the aid of the single ontological thesis 
7 There are some exceptions. For example, Hestevold and Carter (2002: 493) claim that presentism 
should imply the passage of time in the form temporal becoming and Gołosz (2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, 
2017c) maintains that the thesis about existence of the flow of time is a fundamental claim of presentism.
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that only present things exist, or that only present things are real.8 To escape the 
triviality problem,9 they sometimes formulate their view in a more sophisticated way 
after Lewis (1986) by using the notion of existence simpliciter, for example in the 
form: “Only present things exist simpliciter”; or “Necessary, if x exist simpliciter, 
then x presently exists.”10 Whether such articulations of presentism can really escape 
the triviality objection is a controversial issue.11 I will not, however, examine this 
question because I am going to show that we can find a better solution to this prob-
lem in another way and which at the same time introduces dynamics into presentism.
If it is correct that presentism has to admit the existence of the flow of time, then 
the essential issue arises of whether the presentists’ theses in a standard form really 
entails the existence of the flow of time. So the question is whether from the theses 
recalled in the first paragraph of this section alone (and with no other assumption) 
the existence of the flow of time can be inferred.12 It was shown, however, that it is 
generally impossible.13 To see this let us imagine a simple model of the possible 
world—let us call it W† while calling our actual world W—exactly similar to our 
present world W at some fixed moment t0, but such that in W† there existed nothing 
in the past of t0, and there will exist nothing in the future of t0. It would be a static 
“frozen” or “petrified” world with a momentary present at t0 but without a flowing 
time, with no events and no things in the past of t0, and similarly without events 
and things in the future of t0. It would be a “frozen” (or “petrified”) version of pre-
sentism, which, of course, is not in agreement with our experience but this is not 
under consideration. The point is that all the above mentioned ontological theses of 
presentism are true in the world W† although there is no flow of time in the model 
which means that it is impossible to infer the passage of time from these theses.
Presentists can look for the solution to this problem by defining presentism as 
a simple conjunction of the two theses about existence of the present (only) and 
the flow of time. Certainly, it would be a better definition of presentism because 
St. Augustine’s condition AC would then be trivially satisfied. Nevertheless, such 
a solution has some flaws: firstly, presentism defined with the aid of the two the-
ses which make use of ontological notions of different character—static existence 
in the first case and the flow of time possessing undeniably dynamic character in the 
8 The first option can be found in, for example, Merricks (1995: 523); the second one, for example, is to 
be seen in Hinchliff (1996: 122–123).
9 The triviality problem for the controversy between presentism and eternalism consists in this that 
when we examine their ontological theses, saying that only present things exist—in the first case—or 
that the past, the present, and future things exist in the same way—in the second—it turns out that both 
these ontological theses are trivially true or trivially false, depending on the way we understand the verb 
“exists”: in the tensed or in the tenseless way. See, for example, Merricks (1995: 523); and discussions of 
the problem in Zimmerman (2004). It was also shown by Savitt (2006) that application of the predicate 
“being real” does not allow one to escape the triviality problem because of the ambiguity of the term 
“real”.
10 See, for example, Sider (2006: 76); and Hestevold and Carter (2002: 499).
11 See, for example, the critical analysis of Savitt (2006) and Gołosz (2013).
12 For example, Hestevold and Carter (2002: 500–501) claim that the presentist thesis in the just men-
tioned form implies becoming.
13 Such an argument was proposed in Gołosz (2017c: 289).
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second–would lead to an inhomogeneous view.14 Secondly, there is a long tradition 
of presentism consisting in treating the present as a totality of what tensedly exists, 
which would mean that sentences of the type “Only the present things and events 
(tensedly) exist” are analytically true.15 And thirdly—as I will show—the thesis 
about the existence of the flow of time, if properly expressed, suffices to conceptual-
ize presentism in a satisfactory way. The clue to the right expression of the flow of 
time is the notion of becoming so I shall try to show this starting from an analysis of 
this notion.16
The application of the notion of becoming to express the dynamic nature of real-
ity has a long tradition—to recall, for example, Bergson (1944), Whitehead (1967, 
1978), Eddington,17 Broad as those who applied it.18 I shall analyze the notion of 
becoming proposed by Broad (1938), which is relatively clearer and—what is also 
important—was introduced to avoid the essential difficulty associated with the con-
ception of the passage of time, that is, the question about the rate of time’s passage. 
Broad noticed that the passage of time cannot be referred to itself because then the 
ratio of the same two quantities expressing the rate of time’s passage is meaning-
less. Neither can it be referred to a second time dimension because in such a case 
the problem of the flow of time returns, leading to regressus ad infinitum. Instead of 
this, Broad introduced his primitive notion of absolute becoming, which cannot be 
analyzed further: 
To “become present” is, in fact, just to “become”, in an absolute sense; i.e., 
to “come to pass” in the Biblical phraseology, or, most simply, to “happen”. 
Sentences like “This water became hot” or “This noise became louder” record 
facts of qualitative change. Sentences like “This event became present” record 
facts of absolute becoming. (Broad 1938: 280–281)
I do not suppose that so simple and fundamental a notion as that of absolute 
becoming can be analyzed, and I am quite certain that it cannot be analyzed in 
terms of a non-temporal copula and some kind of temporal predicate. (Broad 
1938: 281)
Broad offered us a dynamic image of the world with the real passage of time: 
events come to pass, that is, future events which earlier did not exist come into exist-
ence to cease to be. The static B-relations “later than”, “earlier than”, and “simul-
taneous with” cannot be used to describe Broad’s becoming because his absolute 
becoming introduces real change into the world: events come to pass while—as was 
noticed by McTaggart (to recall again)—the above mentioned B-relations are fixed 
and do not change. In the static world described by the fixed relations, there would 
be no place for coming to pass. For the same reason, absolute becoming cannot be 
14 See Gołosz (2017c: 290).
15 See Gołosz (2013: 53–55; 2015: 819). Such an interpretation of the present reveals the real origin of 
the triviality problem.
16 See also Gołosz (2015, 2017c).
17 See ch. V of his (1929), called “Becoming”.
18 See Broad (1938), Savitt (2014), and Gołosz (2017c).
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treated as a tenseless notion because some events became, some events are becom-
ing, and some other will become, which means that absolute becoming is a paradig-
matically tensed notion.
It is easy to misinterpret Broad’s conception if one only concentrates on an expli-
cation of absolute becoming by means of the happening of events, ignoring at the 
same time Broad’s coming to pass. The happening of events is an ambiguous notion; 
it can be interpreted actively—just as coming into existence to pass—or passively—
as simply being an event at (x; t), or taking place at (x; t). If somebody ignores 
Broad’s explication of becoming as coming to pass and interprets becoming as the 
passive happening of events at some spacetime locations, 12 then, of course, he 
receives the passive tenseless becoming and the static block universe of the eternal-
ist. For example, such a misleading interpretation was proposed by Dorato:
I plan to begin by proposing a new analysis of such a notion [becoming], to be 
regarded, on the wake of Gödel (1949b), simply as the successive occurrence 
(coming into being) of tenselessly conceived facts or events.”19
My suggestion is to explicate, or rather simply equate becoming with the 
notion of ‘taking place’ or ‘occurring’, which is also the natural way to under-
stand change in Broad’s absolute, non-qualitative sense referred to above:
Def: Becoming is real if and only if events successively and mind indepen-
dently take place at their own proper time of occurrence.20
The author equates becoming with taking place or occurring, which leads to a 
passive interpretation of becoming. This static interpretation ignores Broad’s com-
ing to pass and results in the notion of becoming being stripped of any dynamic con-
notations, and as such deforms Broad’s absolute becoming. Such a conception of the 
becoming of events cannot, of course, be used to express the real flow of time.
Because I am looking for a conception of becoming which is self-consistent and 
can be in agreement with everyday experience, I would like to transform this notion 
so as to conform it to this experience—on the one hand—and our knowledge about 
the world—on the other. I would still treat this notion as a primitive notion—exactly 
as Broad did—but I will suggest in this section and in subsequent ones a number 
of proposals which will make this transformed notion more precise by determin-
ing some of its properties.21 Some of these proposals will justify swapping the term 
“becoming” for a new one of “dynamic existence”.
Broad ascribed absolute becoming to instantaneous events, however, it seems that 
the world consists not only of events but, first of all, of things; we can simply equate 
events with acts of acquiring, losing or changing properties by things, which means 
19 Dorato (2002: 256) He describes his position as “a relational, tenseless view of becoming” (p. 270).
20 Dorato (2002: 269). A similar interpretation was proposed by Savitt (Savitt 2002: 159–160) and by 
Dieks (2006). Dieks’ proposal will be analyzed further. Savitt’s interpretation was criticized in Gołosz 
(2017c: 291).
21 In a similar way—let us say—as the axioms in the set theory make the primitive notion of set more 
precise.
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also changes in their position, velocities and relative configurations. For exam-
ple, plants and animals are considered to be primary objects of evolution in Dar-
win’s theory. Even the theory of relativity—contrary to what is widely claimed—
should be interpreted as a theory in which primary ontology consists of things and 
not events: we ascribe, for example, mass, momentum and energy to particles or 
conglomerates of them and not to events. How, for example, will it be possible to 
ascribe mass and momentum to events, which do not possess them? How events can 
move, rotate, and interact one with another? The task of building things from events 
so as such constructions could possess mass, momentum and energy seems to be 
very difficult, if it is possible at all.22 Thus—in what follows—I would treat things 
as primary objects and events and states of affairs as secondary.
One can claim also that things are just the objects which in some way become or 
come into existence. It was noticed by Sellars who wrote: “only things can become 
in the sense of come into being.” (1962: 556) I agree only partly with him; for pre-
sentists, both things and instantaneous events become in the sense that their exist-
ence has a dynamic character. The difference between them is that the latter come 
to pass, the former do not cease to be but persist—which results from our expe-
rience—by enduring, that is by keeping their strict (literal or numerical) identity. 
Even if some objects do not exist at present, such as for example dinosaurs or stars 
which formed heavy metals that we are—inter alia—built of, there still exist parti-
cles which they were built of.
The necessity of acceptance of the endurance of things and the fact that things 
(such as, for example, elementary particles, their smaller and bigger conglomerates 
like atoms, things on the Earth, planets, stars and so on) form a fundamental part 
of the furniture of the world justify—I am convinced—the swapping of the term 
“become” for a new one which I will call “dynamic exist”. This new notion is under-
stood in a tensed sense and is for the presentist—exactly as “become”—irreducible 
to the tenseless one (some objects like Socrates dynamically existed while others, 
like the Earth, dynamically exist and others, like research posts on the Moon, will 
probably dynamically exist).23
To complete the conceptualization of presentism, we have to introduce the notion 
of the present. As I wrote at the end of the last section, there is a long tradition of 
presentism to treat the present as all those objects (things and events) which tensedly 
exist.24 If we follow this tradition, we obtain the present defined as something which 
22 This paper is based on the assumption of scientific realism which says that we should take scien-
tific theories at face value, that is, we should understand them as scientists, who use these theories, and 
one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory imposing such an interpretation on it which 
clashes with the interpretation current among its users. If one wanted to construe physical quantities in 
a theory in a non-standard way, one should prove that theory interpreted in such a way is reasonable and 
can work effectively. See Gołosz (1999: 5, 9).
23 This analysis is to be acceptable for both relationists and substantivalists (regarding the controversy 
of substantivalism vs relationism over substantivalty of space and time); the substantivalist can simply 
ascribe dynamic existence to space (or its parts).
24 See, for example, Prior (1970: 247): “the presentness of an event is just the event. The presentness of 
my lecturing, for instance, is just my lecturing”; Christensen (1993: 168): “To be present is simply to be, 
to exist, and to be present at a given time is just to exist at that time—no less and no more”; and Craig 
(1997: 37): “Presentness is the act of temporal being.” See also Gołosz (2017c: 292).
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is dynamically existing, that is as dynamically existing things and events, and while 
instantaneous events come into being to cease to be, dynamically existing things can 
persist by enduring as, for example, me and my computer. Similarly, the past, that 
is, the past things and events, are here understood as things and events that dynami-
cally existed (past events no longer dynamically exist, past things have been able to 
endure in the whole or in parts until now as, for example, the Acropolis of Athens 
or particles from early stars from population I and II, and the future as things and 
events that will dynamically exist (future events do not dynamically exist yet while 
some of the future things dynamically exist now in the present form, with present 
properties in present states and often unknown future states).
So as a result of these two steps, we have obtained the flow of time defined as 
the dynamic existence of all objects which our world consists of with instantaneous 
events which come into existence to cease to be, and dynamically existing things 
which persist by enduring, and the present as something continuously changing. 
Such an understanding of the flow of time is not only in perfect agreement with our 
experience, but also avoids, exactly like Broad’s becoming, the problem of the ques-
tion of the rate of time’s passage because it only makes use of the primitive notion 
of dynamic existence and does not involve time in any way.25 What is especially 
worth emphasizing is that such an understanding of the flow of time provides us also 
with the right ontology for presentism because it says that exactly what dynamically 
exists are these things and events which we call the present. What is more, the pre-
sent understood in such a way is dynamically changing.
In this way we can obtain a definition of presentism which satisfies St. Augus-
tine’s condition AC. It can be expressed in the form which I will call Dynamic Real-
ity, which—making use of the notion of dynamic existence—expresses at the same 
time the ontological thesis of presentism and the reality of the flow of time:
Dynamic Reality: All of the objects that our world consists of exist 
dynamically.26
The proposed term “Dynamic Reality” (DR) is more adequate than a term of the 
form “The flow (or passage) of time” because time is not involved in this claim. 
What is more—as I shall propose in the fourth and fifth sections—although time is 
not involved in DR, that is, the thesis saying about existence of the flow of time, it 
exists and can just be regarded as a secondary entity constituted by the dynamically 
existing objects.
But what about the presentists’ theses concerning the past and the future: do we 
still need an additional ontological thesis excluding the existence of objects other 
than present? Fortunately, we do not need such additional theses because DR says 
that all of the objects that our world consists of exist dynamically, which means that 
it is unnecessary to talk about not existing (dynamically) objects. That is, we have 
received the intended effect with the single thesis DR and three definitions of the 
dynamically existing objects (called the present), objects which dynamically existed 
25 See Gołosz (2015, 2017c).
26 In Gołosz (2013: 55), a similar ontological thesis was applied.
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and do not dynamically exist (called the past), and objects which do not dynamically 
exist yet (called the future).
The important consequence of such a construction is that we have received a 
dynamic version of presentism introduced with the aid of one single thesis (and the 
three definitions), which means that this position can now be expressed in a simple, 
homogeneous way, satisfying—what is more—St. Augustine’s condition AC. That 
is an important advantage over other formulations of presentism which either do not 
satisfy AC or do so in an inhomogeneous way when this position is formulated with 
the aid of a conjunction of the two theses making use of notions which have differ-
ent character.
It is now the right time to return to the triviality objection. The notion of dynamic 
existence is a tensed notion. Is it, then, justified to say that DR is trivial? The answer 
is no because the notion of the present is not involved in this thesis, neither are the 
past nor the future involved. And, it is obvious that the definitions cannot be accused 
of being trivial. DR simply states that all of the objects which our world consists of 
exist dynamically (what is equivalent to the existence of the flow of time), which can 
be true or false (this last assessment according to the eternalist, of course) but this 
is not trivial. On the contrary, this is a very important and deep claim about reality 
which can be examined by its explanatory value. Our world—as we observe it—is 
one which is dynamically existing (or becoming with enduring things) and continu-
ously changing. And this gives us good reason to believe—I maintain—that DR is 
true. This claim needs, of course, more justification than the sentence given above, 
so I will try show in the next parts of the paper that the proposed conception can 
really explain some phenomena which we observe in a consistent way and make 
it possible to answer—at least in a preliminary way—some difficult metaphysical 
questions mentioned in the first part of the paper.
We can now examine some of the important properties of the introduced notion 
of dynamic existence. First of all, I would like to emphasize its dynamic charac-
ter, which can be contrasted with the standard notion of existence which is used 
in the definitions of both standard versions of presentism and eternalism. For, both 
these views use the notions of existence which have a static character; it is fixed 
existence in fixed moments of time. The difference between them is that standard 
presentism talks about (tensed) existence in one fixed moment of time while eternal-
ism is concerned with (tenseless) existence at all moments of time which leads to 
the formation of a petrified four-dimensional block universe. In contrast, DR intro-
duces the dynamic form of presentism describing our World in statu nascendi—as 
dynamically changing: events come into being to cease to be, things dynamically 
exist enduring and changing their properties.27 According to DR, dynamic existence 
is ascribed to all of the objects of the world.
27 It was shown by Merricks (1994: 177–178; 1995: 526); and Hinchliff (1996: 124–129) that change 
does not involve inconsistency into presentism—contrary to what was claimed by Lewis (1986: 202–
204)—because, according to presentism, no object (dynamically) exist in two (or more) moments of time 
simultaneously.
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The next important feature of dynamic existence which I would now like to dis-
cuss is directionality. This is a very interesting property of dynamic existence that it 
is not symmetrical under time reversal. Events come into being to cease to be, that 
is forming the fixed past consisting of things and events which dynamically existed. 
On the contrary, the future does not exist dynamically yet and seems not to be fixed 
(at least some future events seem not to be determined), it has just to come into 
(dynamic) being. Things come into being persisting through time by enduring, that 
is—so to say metaphorically—they are “moving” into the future keeping their strict 
identity. This means that dynamic existence is intrinsically time-asymmetrical and, 
as such, it is in perfect agreement with our experience. What is worth emphasiz-
ing, is that this asymmetry consists in this that past things and events have already 
dynamically existed and as such are not only fixed, but also possibly known to us by 
their traces (for example, in our memory) and impossible to change for sure, while 
future things and events did not have these possibilities yet; we can sometimes pre-
dict them but we cannot remember them. This is the main difference between the 
future and the past; it would remain even if the future were determined.
The notion of existence that is usually used by presentists has a static character 
and does not have the property of directionality. If the presentists want to “move” 
the present to receive the flow of time, then—even if they are able to solve or omit 
the problem of “How fast is the present moving”—they can do it in both directions 
because there is nothing in this notion which can block such a maneuver. Of course, 
the presentists want to “move” the present towards the future but they desire to do 
so not as a consequence of their ontological thesis but only to be consistent with our 
experience: it does not follow from their notion of existence.
The last property of dynamic existence which I would like to discuss in this 
section concerns the problem of the relations between presentism and persistence 
through time. I assumed above that the dynamic existence in the case of things 
means persistence by enduring. It was assumed partly as a generalization of Sellars’ 
becoming and partly as a conception “inferred” from our experience of persistence: 
as it was said above—metaphorically speaking—things are “moving” or “drawing” 
into the future. Both seem to justify the conviction that we (and other things) persist 
while keeping our strict identity. Thus endurance is—in the case of dynamic exist-
ence—just a simple logical consequence of the way in which we and other things 
exist. This does not mean, however, as I will try to show in the next section, that 
future moments of time are in some way waiting to be fulfilled by things and events 
because it would mean eternalism.
Thus endurance of things is here a simple logical consequence of the dynamic 
existence of things, that is, it is a consequence of their way of existence proposed 
in this paper. We can now compare this solution with other versions of presentism. 
Usually it is assumed that presentism implies endurance, I would like, however, to 
show that there is a logical gap in such inferences. This logical gap was benefitted 
by Brogaard’s (2000) in her simple model of presentism remaining in accordance 
with perdurantism (called by her four-dimensionalism).
The above mentioned argument aiming to show that presentism implies endurant-
ism is very simple: an object cannot have another object as a part if that other object 
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does not exist, so if an object persists at all, it must endure.28 There is the logical 
gap in this argument because from the idea that the past and the future do not exist 
one cannot infer that the persisting object keeps its strict identity. It is possible, after 
all, that an object persists without keeping its strict identity in such a way that it is 
four-dimensional and its temporal parts (or stages)—not strictly identical with them-
selves—are coming consecutively into being. Such a model of persistence, which 
joins together presentism and perdurance, was proposed by Brogaard in her model, 
things have four dimensions (that is, they perdure) in the sense that they have an 
unfolding temporal dimension in addition to the three spatial ones.29
The problem is that presentism defined in the standard way does not imply that 
endurance is necessary; the presentists have to look for another rationale for their 
favorite way of existence. They can, of course, assume an additional postulate about 
endurance but then their view ceases to be homogenous. The presentism proposed in 
this paper, which is based on the notion of dynamic existence, solves this problem in 
a simple way without additional assumptions, a considerable advantage and virtue.
4  St. Augustine’s Questions Revisited: A New Insight into the Nature 
of Time?
We can now return to St. Augustine’s questions:
Q1  Those two times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is 
not, and that to come is not yet?
Q2  How can we say that the present is, if it only comes into existence for a 
moment and passes into time past, that is, if it is tending not to be?
With the aid of the conception of Dynamic Reality the second question Q2 can 
be answered in a simple way: events which we call present ones dynamically exist, 
which means that they come momentarily into being to cease to be. Things dynam-
ically exist by enduring, which means that they come into being by continuously 
changing, by losing some properties and gaining others (including properties of spa-
tial locations, velocities and relative configurations). Their every-time states cease to 
be exactly like instantaneous events. This way we have received the world which is 
continuously changing as it really seems to be.
Dynamic Reality also allows us to answer the first question: past events do not 
dynamically exist because they ceased to be; they did exist dynamically. But quite 
a different answer should be given in the case of things; the past things dynami-
cally exist—lock, stock and barrel, or in parts. Of course, they are always changed, 
nevertheless they dynamically exist. So, for example, the Parthenon in Athens still 
dynamically exists although it is changed and does not look like it did in the time 
28 See, for example, Merricks (1995: 524–526) and Loux (2006: 235–236).
29 Brogaard (2000, Sect. 3). It is also possible to imagine that in spite of spatiotemporal and causal con-
tinuity, there are no persisting things, just as there is no persistence of things in space.
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of Socrates. But as regards Socrates, can we also say that he dynamically exists? 
Socrates does not dynamically exist but the particles which he was built of did not 
vanish, they still dynamically exist, just as atoms of heavier elements dynamically 
exist—for example, carbon, oxygen and iron—which came into existence in the 
nuclear fusion reactions inside the hearts of hot stars billions of years ago. From 
such atoms he was built—and we are made from such atoms ourselves. They are 
parts of us and of our present world.
And what about the future? It does not dynamically exist yet, it will only come 
into (dynamic) existence. Contrary to the past, which dynamically existed and as 
such is fixed and cannot be changed, the future looks as if it were open—our experi-
ence seems to suggest this openness and quantum mechanics confirms this convic-
tion—and perhaps it depends on our actions. But even if it is determined and not 
open, it is not in existentce and will just come into (dynamic) existence.
I have tried to show that the proposed solution to the ontology of presentism and 
the flow of time can provide us with the right answer to St. Augustine’s challenge 
and that it can also explain in a simple way the other fundamental question: why the 
past is fixed and the future seems to be open. And now to turn to the last explana-
tion which I would like to propose, the most speculative but also probably the most 
intriguing. It concerns the most mysterious phenomena we know—time. What is the 
origin and nature of time? The answer, I suppose, lies just in the way of existence 
of all objects which our world consists of. When I introduced the notion of dynamic 
existence, I never appealed to time itself, that is, I did not claim that future objects 
and future moments of time are somewhere waiting to be fulfilled by dynamically 
existing objects. I could not have done this because it would mean introducing the 
four-dimensional block universe of the eternalists into the presentist picture of the 
world and the resulting breakdown of St. Augustine’s condition AC. What I have 
done was to introduce the notion of dynamic existence as a primitive notion which 
has the intrinsic property of directionality. This property means that dynamic exist-
ence distinguishes one direction—toward the future. So what about time? Where do 
future moments come from if they are not waiting somewhere to be fulfilled? There 
remains only one answer which is possible: time is, according to this proposal, a 
consequence of the way we and other inhabitants of the world exist, that is, it is a 
derivative of the dynamic existence of objects: time, that is consecutive moments of 
time—each of each constitutes momentarily present—are created by dynamically 
existing objects, whatever they are.30 In consequence of this, time is a parameter 
which can be used to mark (or label, or measure) consecutive stages of dynamic 
existence of objects.31
30 See also Gołosz (2015: 816–817).
31 I will show in the next section that, thanks to the locality of the dynamic existence of objects, time 
constituted by dynamically existing things is their individual time, which can be equated with the so 
called proper time of the theory of relativity.
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5  Dynamic Existence and Empirical Sciences
The proposed formulation of presentism—as a thesis about dynamic existence of 
the world, that is, the directional (into the future) persistence of all objects through 
time joined with keeping their strict identity (in the case of things) and creation of 
time, the thesis which can be identified with the flow of time—is purely metaphysi-
cal. However, the process which is described by this theory is fully objective and 
of fundamental importance to us so it is hard to imagine that such a process cannot 
be observed by scientists. Therefore the question arises as to whether there are any 
traces of the dynamic existence of the world and the flow of time in the empirical 
science, or simply whether can we find any positive argument in empirical sciences 
in favor of the existence of the flow of time understood in the proposed way.
Because we connect the flowing of time with the continuously changing present, 
to answer this question, one should point out what is now (and its shape), how it 
is changing and whether we can really find such a process of changing present in 
empirical science. I would like to begin to analyze this problem with recalling a 
widespread opinion about an alleged lack of the presence of now in empirical sci-
ences; not only Einstein but also, for example, Adolf Grünbaum were their support-
ers. Einstein is an author of the well-known passage from the letter of condolence to 
his friend Michele Besso’s widow after Besso’s death: “People like us, who believe 
in physics, know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stub-
bornly persistent illusion”.32 In turn, Grünbaum (1967: 7) wrote that “no cognizance 
is taken of nowness (in the sense associated with becoming) in any of the extant 
theories of physics.” However, such a view was criticized by Quentin Smith, who 
argued that it is rooted in a misapprehension, namely on a mistaken belief that a sub-
ject matter which uniquely pertains to observational physics should be represented 
in theoretical physics.33 Physical laws are universal which means that they have to 
hold everywhere and always and that is why we should look for now rather in obser-
vational physics. And, in fact, Smith showed that in observational cosmology we can 
find physical events that possess the property of presentness: the present value of T 
(T being the Hubble age), the present value of energy density and vacuum energy 
density, the present temperature of the cosmic microwave background radiation, and 
so on. The presentness of some events does not appear, for example, in the equa-
tions of the theory of relativity, but that no more shows that no event is present—as 
argued Smith (1994: 5)—than the fact that the location of the earth is not mentioned 
in its equations shows that the earth is not located anywhere.
There is also a well-known problem of the ‘shape’ of the present which arose 
with the advent of the theory of relativity, with specific difficulties connected with 
the special and general versions of this theory. According to the special theory of 
relativity (STR), we have no distinguished hypersurface of simultaneity, which 
could play a role of now, and in turn Gödel (1949a, b) showed that we should not 
32 See Norton (2010) and Gołosz (2017b) for their doubts about Einstein’s position.
33 Smith (1985: 112–115); (1993: 21–23); (1994: 5); (2005: 477–478). The same point is emphasized by 
Dieks (1988: 459–460).
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introduce global hypersurfaces of simultaneity as a proposal for now because there 
are some solutions of the field equations of the general theory of relativity (GTR)—
for example, his own solution with closed timelike loops is just such a case—where 
no global hypersurface of simultaneity exists. These are not difficulties that cannot 
be overcome: to remove the first obstacle, it is sufficient to choose the present in a 
relativistically invariant way; and to remove both, it is sufficient to choose the local 
present as the point-like here-now (e.g. Stein 1968, 1991; Čapek 1976; Shimony 
1993; Dorato 2002; and Dieks 1988, 2006) because this last solution is also relativ-
istically invariant.34
Does the proposed formulation of presentism based on the notion of dynamic 
existence satisfy this criterion of locality? Fortunately, dynamic existence can be 
ascribed to singular objects which means that it has an intrinsically local character: 
each object dynamically exist forming its own point-like present. To recall Prior and 
Craig: “the presentness of an event is just the event” (Prior 1970: 247); “Presentness 
is the act of temporal being” (Craig 1997: 37). As a consequence, the proposed in 
this paper notions of dynamic existence and the present have the desired local char-
acter and as such can be reconciled with GTR. This is, in fact—exactly as in the case 
of the directionality—an advantage of this notion and of the approach which makes 
use of it.
What is interesting and worth emphasizing is that the notions of dynamic exist-
ence and the present which are proposed in this paper have an essential advantage 
over Dorato (2002) and Dieks’ (2006) proposals of reconciliation of becoming with 
GTR because they introduce a notion of becoming which has been stripped of the 
whole dynamics. Because I recalled Dorato’s becoming earlier, I will only mention 
Dieks’ relational, tenseless view of becoming here:
Thus, our proposal is that ‘coming into being’ means the same thing as ‘hap-
pening’. Since everything that happens is recorded in the block universe dia-
gram, ‘coming into being’ is also fully represented. There is no need to aug-
ment the block universe in any way.
This proposal boils down to a deflationary analysis of becoming: becoming 
is nothing but the happening of events, in their temporal order. (Dieks 2006: 
170–171)
So according to this proposal, ‘coming into being at (x,t)’ is what it means to 
be an event at (x,t). (Dieks 2006: 172)
Therefore, for example, according to Dorato and Dieks’ proposal, the trial of 
Socrates comes (in the tenseless sense of this word) into being or happens (in the 
tenseless sense of this word) in 399 BC, and the death of Socrates takes (in the 
tenseless sense of this word) place or happens (in the tenseless sense of this word) 
34 For example, (Dieks 2006: 157) wrote: “I propose that if we want to make sense of becoming we 
should attempt to interpret it as something purely local. Second, I address the question of what this local 
becoming consists in. I maintain that processes of becoming are nothing but the successive happening 
of events, and that this happening of events consists entirely in the occurring of these events at their 
own spacetime locations. This leads to a consistent view of becoming, which is applicable even to rather 
pathological spacetimes.”.
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after the trial. But if these are tenseless facts (so called B-facts),35 which can be 
stated in sentences whose truth-value does not change, and where there is no place 
for the distinguished and changing present, so where is there room for the becoming 
and flow of time?
Dieks asks: “Events come into being by occurring, by happening; what other 
coming into being could there be?” (Dieks 2006: 170) The answer is so simple that 
one may wonder why he did not give it: to really come into existence of the objects 
which did not exist earlier there has to be a distinguished present which is continu-
ally changing and which cannot be a relational, static B—fact; a tensed language 
to express these A—facts has to be used as well. The notion of dynamic existence 
proposed in this paper and the notion of the present derived from it are expressed 
in tensed language, the present (as what dynamically exists) is continuously chang-
ing, and that is why they introduce a real dynamics to the world. Thanks to this, 
the view which is proposed here is a real full-blooded presentism and not a tertium 
quid between presentism and eternalism as is the case of the position of Dorato and 
Dieks.
What is also worth emphasizing, in the conceptions of Stein (1968, 1991), Čapek 
(1976), Shimony (1993), Dorato (2002), and Dieks (1988, 2005), the point-like pre-
sent was chosen in order to be relativistically invariant solutions to the problem indi-
cated by Gödel, or as a solution choosing epistemologically close (directly accessi-
ble) set of sense data, but not because of some purely ontological reason: the notion 
of present were chosen independently of the notion of becoming and similarly the 
status of time was not explained. However, in the proposed conception based on 
the notion of the dynamic existence, the local character of the present was a con-
sequence of local character of dynamic existence and time is closely connected 
with dynamic existence: I wrote at the end of the last section that time is created or 
constituted by dynamically existing objects and it is a parameter which can be used 
to mark (or label, or measure) consecutive stages of dynamic existence of singular 
things.
Thanks to the locality of the dynamic existence of objects and the locality of now, 
time constituted by dynamically existing objects is their individual time, which can 
be equated with the so called proper time of the theory of relativity. What is more, 
by the conception proposed in this paper, we can receive not only an explanation of 
the origin of time but also the absent origin of dynamics of the point-like here-now 
moving along or traversing world lines of things in the conceptions like these of 
Čapek Whitrow (1980), Dieks (1988), and Shimony.36 They all introduced the mov-
ing now conceptions of the present with the now-points moving along or traversing 
world lines of things, but they were unable to explain what was the source of the 
35 Tenseless facts, called also B-facts, include necessary facts and contingent facts concerning which 
events are simultaneous, or how much earlier or later events are than each other. Contingent facts con-
cerning which events are present, or past, or future are called A-facts. See e.g. Mellor (1998: 19).
36 For example, Shimony (1993: 284) noted: “Something fleeting does indeed traverse the world line, but 
that something is not subjective; it is the transient now, which as a matter of objective fact is momentar-
ily present and thereafter is past. Without this minimal amount of objectivity there cannot even be an 
illusion of transiency”.
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dynamics of their now-points. The proposed conception points to the dynamic exist-
ence of physical things such as, for example, elementary particles or their conglom-
erates, as an origin of this dynamics.
It is sometimes claimed that nothing in known physics corresponds to the passage 
of time.37 As far as it only means that there is no theory of the flow of time in phys-
ics, I agree.38 What is more, I would like even to show that there are good reasons 
to believe that a theory of the (objective) flow time is to be sought—just as it was 
proposed above—on a deeper level in metaphysics, and not in science.39 And, inter-
estingly enough, there are—outside and inside of empirical science—some powerful 
arguments for the existence of the flow of time and I will introduce them below.
So first of all, why should we search for the theory of the flow of time in met-
aphysics, and not in physics? We should do so—I am convinced—because every 
plausible theory of the flow of time ought to explain two things: firstly, why this that 
exists (that is, the present things) is continuously changing; and secondly, why we 
persist through time, keeping strict or numerical identity, or, in other words, why we 
endure. This means that in such a theory notions and conceptions that are analyzed 
just by metaphysics and not by science are involved: notions of existence, persis-
tence through time, and diachronic identity over time.
Of course, there is no proof that a theory of the flow of time is beyond the reach 
of science (and there cannot be) and it cannot be a priori excluded that—as in the 
case of doctrine of atomism which was a purely metaphysical doctrine for over two 
thousand years —scientists will be able to propose some theory of the objective flow 
of time in the future. The author of this paper is, however, skeptical of such a pos-
sibility simply because—if the presented approach is correct—a fundamental notion 
of existence is involved in the flow of time, which is the basis for our thinking and 
which cannot be further explained by science. Science can analyze what entities are 
posited by our theories, that is which objects exist according to these theories. It also 
can investigate whether such and such things exist, such as the Higgs boson or suba-
tomic particles which dark matter can consist of, and what their properties are, but 
cannot analyze—it seems—what it means that they exist.
However, even if we agree that metaphysics can provide us with a theory of 
the flow of time, the problem mentioned in the beginning of this section remains, 
namely, if the process which is described by such a metaphysical theory is fully 
objective and of fundamental importance for us, it should be in some way endorsed 
as such by science. So, is the existence of the flow of time authenticated by empiri-
cal sciences or not? I claim that not only should the answer be positive but, what is 
more, its impact on empirical science is so big that without the existence the flow of 
time our best scientific theories would be incomprehensible. And the point is that, 
as it is well known, the main subject of interest of physicists (who are, for exam-
ple, interested in the evolution of universe) but also chemists (in the case of, for 
37 See, for example, Davies (2002: 40).
38 In the next part of this section, I would like to show that physics (and other empirical sciences as well) 
allows us to analyze and describe dynamic processes of physical systems.
39 I follow Bergson, Whitehead, and James here.
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example, chemical processes in the non-equilibrium systems), biologists (for exam-
ple, in Darwin’s theory of evolution or theories describing evolution of ecosystems), 
sociologists (for example, in the theories describing the dynamics of social groups), 
psychologists (for example, in developmental psychology) are dynamic systems of 
different kinds. Scientists are searching for theories describing the evolution in time 
of such systems, which makes possible the understanding of the mechanisms that 
underlie these processes and making predictions. And so, for example, we use Dar-
win’s theory of evolution to explain the evolution and variety of life on Earth, the 
GTR to understand the evolution of the universe—its past and the possible future—
and quantum mechanics (QM) to analyze the evolution of quantum systems. Of 
course, we are also sometimes interested in the spatial distribution of the parts of 
some systems, for example, in the geographical differences of our biosphere, but 
nonetheless we explain these geographical differences by means of the temporal 
evolution in different climatic conditions and our interest in the temporal evolution 
of dynamic systems is incomparably greater.
From the point of view of somebody who denies the flow of time, it is hard to 
explain why we are so interested in the variability of different systems in time rather 
than in space, and why we are so interested in explanations in terms of former 
causes rather than in teleological ones. And it is especially hard for them to explain 
our asymmetrical interest in the temporal properties of dynamic systems both in sci-
ence and in everyday life, namely why we care much more about the future than 
about the past. If they try to explain this by invoking the evolutionary and selectional 
value of such asymmetric preferences, as Mehlberg (1980: 200–202) and Horwich 
(1987: 196–198) did for example, they are obliged to explain why our past-oriented 
care and desires cannot be fulfilled and are useless, although those that are future-
oriented are useful. Such an explanation cannot simply appeal to empirical facts 
on pain of begging the question, because these empirical facts (the future-oriented 
evolution) are already temporally asymmetric and this is just the asymmetry of the 
fixed past—the open (as we believe) future which is involved in this explanation and 
should be explained.
The world with the flow of time is the world—as it often emphasized in this 
paper—in statu nascendi. This is the world which is dynamically changing and if 
the proposed approach to the flow of time is correct, scientists should look not for 
the present and its “motion”, but rather for the dynamic existence of the world, that 
is, for the dynamic evolution or temporal becoming of these systems. And it turns 
out that we really have theories which describe dynamically the temporal evolution 
of biological and physical systems, namely Darwin’s theory of evolution in biol-
ogy, and in physics such theories as, for example, Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s 
theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum mechanics. These physical theories 
determine the derivatives of some physical entities, like momentum (in Newtonian’s 
theory), or the electric and magnetic fields (in the case of Maxwell’s equations), 
or the so-called scale factor describing the evolution of the universe (in the Fried-
mann equations derived from the Einstein field equations),40 or the system’s wave 
40 See e.g. Kopczyński and Trautman (1992: 156–161).
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function (in the case of Schrödinger equation in QM) with respect to time, that is, 
they describe how these entities are evolving or changing in time. Thus, contrary 
to what was claimed, for example by Davies and was recalled in this section, the 
adherent of existence of the flow of time can simply interpret such dynamic theories 
just as theories describing dynamic existence or temporal becoming of the world or 
respective parts of it, without, however, introducing a theory of the flow of time.
In the last part of this section I would like to briefly analyze the problem of the 
directionality of causation in the context of physics and to show that the proposed 
approach involving the notion of the dynamic existence can help us to solve this 
problem. Namely, if we consider the problem of the directionality of causation in the 
context of physics, it is reasonable to assume that physical interactions are involved 
in all causal relations and responsible for them, and then two difficult problems arise 
which are connected one with another and hard to explain: the problems of the direc-
tion of causation and of the asymmetry of traces. They are conjugated because we 
can suppose that this is just the directionality of causation in the forward direction 
which is responsible for the lack of the traces of the future: a charged particle, for 
example, can only leave a white track in a bubble chamber after moving through it 
because this particle can cause ionization of a superheated liquid.41 This causation, 
however, is forward directed and that is why we cannot observe now in the bubble 
charged chamber particles which will move through it in the future although we can 
observe traces of particles which moved in the past through the chamber. And when 
we try to find out why this causation in which electromagnetic forces are involved is 
future directed, we meet a difficult problem because electromagnetic forces are time 
reversal invariant. The problem is, of course, more general. In fact, all physical inter-
action—with the exception of weak interaction—are time reversal invariant, so why 
is the causation we observe in the world always future directed, that is, why events 
from the past and from the present affect those which occur later, but we have no 
evidence of backward causation?
The main source of this difficulty is that all physical interactions with the excep-
tion of weak interactions are time reversal invariant, that is, whenever a sequence 
of states S1, S2, … Sn is possible according to time reversible laws of physics, then 
the reverse sequence of time reversed states T (Sn), T (Sn-1),… T (S1) is also possible 
according to these laws (where T is a time–reversal operator). To be sure, the weak 
interactions are not time reversal invariant, but they are not involved in the causal 
relations we observe in normal situations, for example when we are speaking, writ-
ing, walking, watching TV etc.42
41 There was a trial undertaken by Reichenbach (1956: 150–151) and his followers (Smart 1967, 2005: 
469; and Grünbaum 1973: 235–236, 281–289) to explain the asymmetry of traces by entropy consid-
erations, namely, by introducing space ensemble of branch systems with different levels of orderliness 
which can interact one with another. However, it was shown by Earman (1974: 34 - 45), that an assump-
tion speaking about the asymmetry of causation concerning interactions between the two systems was 
involved in this reasoning and it was responsible for the asymmetry of traces. See also Horwich (1987) 
and Gołosz (2017b).
42 Feynman (1967, ch. 5) noticed a long time ago, shortly after the discovery of the CP symmetry viola-
tion, that the distinction between the past and the future cannot depend on asymmetries of weak interac-
tions. See also Sklar (1974), Gołosz (2017a, b).
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The metaphysical conception proposed in this paper solves this problem by 
appealing to the dynamic existence of things. For even if physical interactions (with 
the exception of the weak interactions) do not distinguish any time direction and 
even if we assume that the interactions are immediate, according to the proposed 
conception, what is responsible for a direction of causation is the dynamic existence 
of things, which is—as I tried to persuade in the previous section—future directed. 
Interacting bodies dynamically exist in the future direction and just in this direction 
transport effects of interactions with themselves as is, for example, the case in the 
growing of microscopic bubbles along the ionization track in the bubble chamber 
or a change of momentum of interacting particles. That is why we always observe 
a causation which is future directed although we have good reason to believe that 
physical interactions are always involved in causation and these are (modulo weak 
interactions) time reversal invariant.
6  Conclusions
The paper tried to show that presentists should admit the dynamic version of pre-
sentism assuming the existence of the flow of time in order to be in accordance with 
everyday experience and to make their view self-consistent. It also attempted to 
demonstrate that the ontological thesis of presentism formulated with the aid of the 
notion of dynamic existence suffices for the correct formulation of presentism and 
that such a formulation gives us important theoretical benefits. Namely, it allows us:
1. To develop a full-blooded tensed theory of the flow of time, which avoids vicious 
circles and regressus ad infinitum and, thanks to locality, can be claimed to remain 
in agreement with the General Theory of Relativity;
2. To express presentism in a simple, homogenous way;
3. To satisfy St. Augustine’s condition concerning the flow of time, and to answer 
his ontological questions concerning the past, the present, and the future;
4. To explain a possible origin of the moving present of our experience;
5. To explain what is the origin of asymmetry of time, and especially why the past 
is fixed while the future seems to be open and why we have traces of the past and 
no traces of the future;
6. To explain what is the origin of the directionality of causation in spite of the fact 
that physical interactions (with the exception of the weak interactions) are time 
reversal invariant;
7. To propose a possible explanation of the origin of the fundamental time of the 
Theory of Relativity, that is the so called proper time.
The last points in this list mean—if the proposed metaphysical theory is cor-
rect—that the presented conception is able to explain the fundamental problems we 
face in metaphysics: the problem of the origin of the direction of time (points 4, 5, 
6) and the even more important problem of the origin of time itself (point 7). The 
explanatory value of the proposed conception and difficulty of the problems it solves 
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should testify to the superiority of this conception over the standard formulations of 
presentism.
The proposed change in the metaphysics of presentism is not extensive—it only 
involves the alteration of precisely one notion, the notion of existence, and then, in 
consequence, a new approach to time—nevertheless it is fundamental just because 
it concerns our two most elementary notions: the notions of existence and time. The 
author of this paper, who is working on the common ground of physics and phi-
losophy, is aware that the proposed conception, by looking for the solution to central 
problems concerning the physical world in metaphysics rather than in physics, goes 
against the mainstream of physics and philosophy of science. Nonetheless, he does 
not see any other possible solution to the above mentioned exciting puzzles. They 
are fundamental ones and need to be solved if we want to understand ourselves and 
the world we live in.
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